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COMMENT
PRIVACY AND THE ALASKA
CONSTITUTION:  FAILING TO
FULFILL THE PROMISE
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
In this Comment, the Author examines two recent Alaska Su-
preme Court decisions regarding privacy rights and contends that
the Alaska Supreme Court failed to protect the greater privacy
rights granted under the Alaska Constitution.  The Comment con-
siders the issues confronted by the Alaska Supreme Court and
compares the decisions with United States Supreme Court deci-
sions examining similar issues.  The Author concludes by consid-
ering the implication of these decisions as well as urging the
Alaska Supreme Court to aggressively uphold the protections of
privacy granted in the Alaska Constitution.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Most Americans would be surprised to learn that there is no
right to privacy granted in the United States Constitution.  The
Fourth Amendment protects privacy in limiting police searches and
arrests,1 but privacy in terms of autonomy and the right to be let
alone by the government is not mentioned in the text of the Consti-
tution.  Unfortunately, the first United States Supreme Court deci-
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* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political
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1. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” U.S. CONST. Amend IV.
CHEMERINSKY_CORRECTED.DOC 05/07/03  4:36 PM
30 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:1
sion to speak expressly of privacy, in the sense of personal auton-
omy, has a shaky foundation.  In Griswold v. Connecticut,2 the Su-
preme Court declared unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the
use of contraceptives.3  Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
found the right to privacy in the “penumbra” of the First, Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.4  As one commentator described
it, Justice Douglas “skipped through the Bill of Rights like a
cheerleader - ‘Give me a P . . . give me an R . . . an I . . .,’ and so on,
and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or penumbral right.”5
In sharp contrast, the Alaska Constitution expressly safe-
guards privacy rights.  Article I, section 22 states that the “right of
the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”6
Similarly, article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution provides
that “all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, [and] the pur-
suit of happiness.”7  The Supreme Court of Alaska furthered this
concept when it stated that “at the core of this concept [of liberty]
is the notion of total personal immunity from governmental con-
trol: the right ‘to be let alone.’”8
Alaska constitutional law is clear that greater rights can be
protected under the Alaska Constitution than are recognized under
the United States Constitution.9  As the Alaska Supreme Court de-
clared in Roberts v. State, “We are not bound in expounding the
Alaska Constitution’s Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, past or future, which expound iden-
tical or closely similar provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion.”10  Indeed, the first Alaska Supreme Court decision inter-
preting the privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution—added by
voter initiative in 1972—upheld the constitutional right of indi-
viduals to use marijuana in their homes.11  Justice Rabinowitz,
writing for the court, stated that residents of Alaska “have a basic
right to privacy in their homes under Alaska’s Constitution . . . .
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Id. at 485.
4. Id. at 484-85.
5. Robert G. Dixon, The “New” Substantive Due Process and the Democratic
Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84 (1976).
6. ALASKA CONST., art. 1, § 22.
7. Id. art. 1, § 1.
8. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972).
9. Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969).
10. Id.  For an excellent defense of the protection of greater rights under the
Alaska Constitution, see Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” Pro-
fessor Gardner: Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1995).
11. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975).
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[This right] would encompass the possession and ingestion of sub-
stances such as marijuana in a purely personal, non-commercial
context . . . .”12
The Alaska Supreme Court continues, at times, to provide
greater protection for privacy rights under the Alaska Constitution
than under the United States Constitution.  For example, in Alaska
Department of Health & Social Services v. Planned Parenthood,13
the Alaska Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law
that prohibited Medicaid funding of abortions unless the pregnant
woman is at risk of dying from her pregnancy or the pregnancy re-
sults from rape or incest.14  The court found that the denial of
Medicaid assistance to poor women who medically require abor-
tions violates equal protection under the Alaska Constitution,15
even though the United States Supreme Court has concluded that
the failure to fund abortions does not violate the United States
Constitution.16  Similarly, in State v. Planned Parenthood,17 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the State could require parental
consent for an unmarried minor’s abortion only if it proved a com-
pelling interest in enforcing the parental consent statute and that
the statute was properly tailored to promote the State’s interest.18
The United States Supreme Court, in contrast, has consistently up-
held parental notice and/or consent requirements so long as there
is an alternative procedure whereby a minor can obtain an abortion
if doing so would be in her best interest or if she is mature enough
to decide for herself.19
12. Id. at 504; see also Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 754 (Alaska 2001) (up-
holding a registration requirement for medical use of marijuana); Walker v. State,
991 P.2d 799, 803 (Alaska 1999) (upholding the prohibition of possession of more
than eight ounces of marijuana as possession with intent to sell).
13. 28 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2001).
14. Id. at 915.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (holding that a state
was not required to pay for abortions when it would not be reimbursed by the fed-
eral government); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of denying funding for abortions).
17. 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001).
18. Id. at 46.
19. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979); see also Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510-13 (1990) (finding an Ohio ju-
dicial bypass statute to be constitutional because the statute allowed the minor to
show she had the maturity to make the decision or that the abortion was in her
best interest, preserved the minor’s anonymity, and set appropriate time limits on
judicial action); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1990) (upholding
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Against this backdrop, several recent decisions of the Alaska
Supreme Court are troubling in their rejection of privacy claims
under the Alaska Constitution.  In this Comment, I examine two
recent decisions denying protection of privacy under the Alaska
Constitution.  In Sampson v. State,20 the Alaska Supreme Court re-
fused to find protection for a right to physician-assisted suicide,21
and in Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Anchor-
age,22 the court upheld a drug testing policy for police and fire de-
partment employees, without individualized suspicion, when indi-
viduals applied for employment, promotion, or transfer.23
These decisions should be of concern because they reject a
right of privacy in areas of particular importance and may signal a
retreat from more extensive protection of privacy under the Alaska
Constitution.  At the very least, these rulings fail to live up to the
broad interpretation of privacy under the Alaska Constitution ar-
ticulated by Justice Rabinowitz in his early opinions.24
Part II of this Comment examines the Sampson ruling, in
which the court rejected the right to physician-assisted suicide.
Part III analyzes Anchorage Police Department and the allowance
of drug testing without individual suspicion for certain municipal
employees.  Finally, the Comment concludes by considering the po-
tential implications of these decisions and argues for aggressive
protection of privacy under the Alaska Constitution.
II.  PRIVACY AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Rejection of a Right to
Physician-Assisted Suicide
Few Supreme Court decisions have the possibility of touching
as many lives, directly or indirectly, as those holding that there is
no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.  Washington v.
Glucksberg25 and Vacco v. Quill26 effectively uphold laws in forty-
requirements for parental notice and/or consent for unmarried minors’ abortions
so long as there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure).
20. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
21. Id. at 100.
22. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001).
23. Id. at 556-57.
24. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (recognizing a
privacy interest for “possession of marijuana by adults at home for personal use”).
25. 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997) (holding that laws prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide do not violate a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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nine states that prohibit aiding another in committing suicide.
However, although the decisions were rendered without a single
dissent, they leave open the possibility of legal protection for such
a right at the state level, either under state constitutions, such as
Alaska’s, or state statutes, such as Oregon’s “Death With Dignity
Act.”27
In Glucksberg and Quill, the Court had before it two court of
appeals decisions that found a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide.  The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, found
that terminally ill individuals have a fundamental liberty interest to
physician-assisted suicide, protected under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.28  The court declared unconstitu-
tional a Washington law stipulating that “[a] person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids an-
other person to commit suicide.”29 The court then concluded that
“the Constitution encompasses a Due Process liberty interest in
controlling the time and manner of one’s death—that there is, in
short, a constitutionally recognized ‘right to die.’”30
Just a few weeks after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Second
Circuit declared unconstitutional a New York law that prohibited
26. 521 U.S. 793, 796-97 (1997) (holding that laws prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide do not violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
27. ORE. REV. STAT. §127.800 (1996) (specifically allowing physician-assisted
suicide).
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a directive in November 2001 chal-
lenging Oregon’s act.  The directive declares that:
• controlled substances may not be dispensed to assist suicide, thus
reversing the position taken by his predecessor, Attorney General
Janet Reno, in June 1998.
• assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” and that pre-
scribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances
violates the [Controlled Substance Act].
• prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled sub-
stances to assist suicide may “render [a physician’s] registration . . .
inconsistent with the public interest” and therefore subject to possi-
ble suspension or revocation . . . .
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1078-79 (D. Ore. 2002) (quoting 66 FR
56608 (Nov. 9, 2002)).  The State of Oregon sought declaratory and injunctive re-
lief to prevent enforcement of the directive.  Id. at 1084.  The district court en-
tered a permanent injunction “enjoining the defendants from enforcing, applying,
or otherwise giving any legal effect to the Ashcroft directive.”  Id. at 1080.
28. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (emphasis in original), rev’d sub nom. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
29. Id. at 794 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (2000)) (emphasis in
original).
30. Id. at 816.
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aiding another in committing suicide.31  Several physicians and
gravely ill patients challenged the New York statute, which stated
that “[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
when . . . [h]e intentionally causes or aids another person to commit
suicide.”32  The Second Circuit found that the New York law vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33
The court reasoned that competent patients on artificial life sup-
port already have the right to physician-assisted suicide based on
their right to terminate life support equipment.34  In Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Missouri Department of Health,35 the Supreme Court ruled
that competent adults have the right to refuse even life-sustaining
medical treatment.36  The Second Circuit said that in light of this
decision, those not receiving artificial life support are discriminated
against because they do not have a right to physician-assisted sui-
cide.37  The court concluded that this latter group is denied equal
protection.38
The United States Supreme Court reversed both of these court
of appeals decisions.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the major-
ity in each case.  In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court rejected
the claim that the Washington law prohibiting assisted suicide vio-
lated a fundamental right protected under the Due Process
Clause.39  Rehnquist’s opinion began by observing that a right is
protected as fundamental under the Due Process Clause when sup-
ported by history or tradition.40  Rehnquist then stated that “for
over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has
punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and attempting
suicide.”41
Rehnquist noted that “[i]n almost every State—indeed, in al-
most every western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide.”42
After reviewing the history of laws prohibiting suicide and assis-
31. Quill, 80 F.3d at 731.
32. Id. at 719 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987)).
33. Id. at 731.
34. Id. at 727-28.  The pre-existing right the court spoke about was the right to
termination of life support equipment, which is not necessarily equivalent to phy-
sician-assisted suicide.
35. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
36. Id. at 261.
37. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
38. Id. at 731.
39. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
40. Id. at 710 (stating that history is where the analysis of whether a right is a
protected right should begin).
41. Id. at 711.
42. Id. at 710.
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tance of suicide, Rehnquist wrote, “Despite changes in medical
technology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the im-
portance of end-of-life decisionmaking, we have not retreated from
this prohibition [of assisting suicide].”43  The Court thus concluded
that “[t]o hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries
of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered pol-
icy choice of almost every state.”44
Because the Court determined that “the asserted ‘right’ to as-
sistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process clause,” the Washington law was to
be upheld so long as it met a rational basis test.45  The Court found
that the law reasonably served many legitimate interests, including
the preservation of life, protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession, protecting vulnerable groups, and stopping the
path to voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia.46
Similarly, in Quill, the Supreme Court held that a New York
law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.47  Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the
majority, initially noted that the prohibition of assisted suicide in
this particular statute neither discriminated against a suspect class
(such as a racial minority) nor violated a fundamental right since
Glucksberg had expressly repudiated those contentions.48  Under
equal protection analysis, this meant that the law should be upheld
so long as it met a rational basis test.49
Moreover, the Court rejected the claim that New York’s law
discriminated against anyone.50  In its decision, the Court noted
that New York’s law treated everyone equally, that all people have
the right to refuse medical care, and that all people are prohibited
from assisting another person in committing suicide.51  The Court
specifically disagreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that
those not on artificial life support are discriminated against as
compared with those who can receive physician-assisted suicide by
demanding the termination of a respirator or artificial nutrition or
hydration, calling it a “distinction [which] comports with funda-
43. Id. at 719.
44. Id. at 723.
45. Id. at 728.
46. Id. at 728, 731-32.
47. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997).
48. Id. at 799.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 800.
51. Id.
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mental legal principles of causation and intent.”52  The Court ex-
plained that “when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a
patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is
killed by that medication.”53
The Supreme Court’s refusal to find a right to physician-
assisted suicide under the United States Constitution does not pro-
hibit states from protecting such a right.54  The Court has empha-
sized the general absence of constitutional limits on state-assisted
suicide laws.55  In other words, the issue of whether there is a right
to die is left to the political process and state constitutions; states
may prohibit or allow physician-assisted suicide largely uncon-
strained by the Constitution.  For example, in 1994, Oregon en-
acted through a ballot initiative a “Death With Dignity Act,” which
legalized physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill
adults.56
B. The Alaska Supreme Court Rejects a Right to Physician-
Assisted Suicide
Despite the enumeration of a right to privacy under the
Alaska Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court in Sampson v.
State57 also rejected a constitutional right to physician-assisted sui-
cide.58  Kevin Sampson and Jane Doe were mentally competent,
terminally ill patients who sought a court order that they had a
right to physician-assisted suicide under the Alaska Constitution
and thus that their physicians should be exempt from prosecution
for aiding their suicides.59  Specifically, Sampson and Doe con-
tended that “the guarantees of privacy and liberty in article I of the
52. Id. at 801.
53. Id.
54. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716-19 (1997) (discussing the
recent development of movements in some states to rethink the ban on physician-
assisted suicide, all of which, save Oregon, have ended with no change in the ban).
55. See id. at 716 (noting that states have reexamined and reaffirmed bans on
assisted-suicide).
56. Oregon Rev. Stat. §127.800 et seq.  The statute reads: “An adult who is ca-
pable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the attending physi-
cian and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal illness, and who has
voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for medi-
cation for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified man-
ner . . . .”  § 127.805 § 2.01(1).
57. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
58. Id. at 90.
59. Id.
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Alaska Constitution protect their right to control the timing and
manner of their deaths.”60
The Alaska Supreme Court began by observing that since
Alaska became a state there had always been a law prohibiting as-
sisted suicide.61  The court noted that the Alaska legislature had
considered a bill, closely resembling Oregon’s law, to allow physi-
cian-assisted suicide, but that it failed to pass.62  The court then re-
viewed the Alaska cases concerning the right to privacy and con-
cluded that “[a]ll of these cases address situations involving
personal autonomy to control our appearance or to direct the
course of our lives; none even remotely hints at any historical or le-
gal support for the proposition that the general right of personal
autonomy incorporates a right to physician-assisted suicide.”63
The court thus expressly rejected the claim that there is a fun-
damental right to physician-assisted suicide under the Alaska Con-
stitution.64  The court then proceeded to apply mere rational basis
review and, not surprisingly, found that this deferential standard
was met.65  Like the United States Supreme Court in Glucksberg66
and Quill,67 the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the State has
a “strong interest in protecting potentially vulnerable Alaskans, in-
cluding terminally ill persons, from undue influence.”68  The court
also expressed concern over how “mental competence” would be
defined or determined, as the plaintiffs sought a right to physician-
assisted suicide only for such individuals.69  Similarly, the court said
that it would be difficult to limit such a right to “terminally ill pa-
tients.”70
The court said that these problems might be dealt with, but
“because . . . suicide is so firmly rooted in questions of social policy,
60. Id. at 91 (citation and quotations omitted).
61. Id. at 92.  Currently under Alaska law, “[a] person commits the crime of
manslaughter if the person . . . intentionally aids another person to commit sui-
cide.”  ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (Michie 2002); see also id. § 11.15.150 (re-
pealed 1978).
62. Sampson, 31 P.3d at 93.
63. Id. at 94.
64. Id. at 95 (“[W]e reject Sampson and Doe’s contention that physician-
assisted suicide is a fundamental right within the core meaning of the Alaska Con-
stitution’s privacy and liberty clauses.”).
65. See id. at 95-96.
66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
67. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
68. Sampson, 31 P.3d at 96.
69. Id. at 97.
70. Id.
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rather than constitutional tradition, it is a quintessentially legisla-
tive matter.”71  The court thus concluded
[a]ccordingly, we hold that the right to physician-assisted suicide
is not implicit in text, context, or history of the Alaska Constitu-
tion’s liberty and privacy clauses.  While these guarantees en-
compass a broad range of autonomy, they do not require an ex-
emption to Alaska’s manslaughter statute that would provide for
physician-assisted suicide.72
C. The Alaska Supreme Court’s Failure
Ultimately, the key question in appraising the Alaska Supreme
Court’s decision is whether terminally ill, competent adults should
have a right to physician-assisted suicide.  None of us can answer
this question without reference to the experiences of our own
families and fears.  Justice O’Connor recognized this in beginning
her concurring opinion in Glucksberg by observing that “[d]eath
will be different for each of us.  For many, the last days will be
spent in physical pain and perhaps the despair that accompanies
physical deterioration and a loss of control of basic bodily and
mental functions.” 73
Ten years ago, as my father was dying of lung cancer, he asked
his doctor for medication to end his life.  He was far too weak to
get out of his hospital bed, let alone act to end his own life.  He ei-
ther was in great pain or sedated into constant sleep.  When he
awoke, he was lucid but obviously in enormous discomfort.  A few
days before he died, he simply wanted it over.  His doctor brushed
aside his request by ignoring it, though it was repeated several
times.
I cannot consider the constitutional issue of a right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide without having in mind the searing image of
my father in his hospital bed, gasping for each breath, and wanting
to end his pain.  I cannot imagine any interest that the State had in
keeping my father alive for several additional days.  If liberty
means anything, I think it must include a right, for those like my fa-
ther, to die with dignity.
The Alaska Supreme Court erred in several ways in failing to
recognize this right.  First, the court was wrong to determine
whether there is a fundamental right solely based on history and
tradition.  Other privacy rights have been protected under the
71. Id. at 98.
72. Id.
73. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring).
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Alaska Constitution—such as the right to use marijuana74 and abor-
tion rights75—even though there was no history or tradition of safe-
guarding these liberties.  History and tradition can describe what
has been the practice; they cannot disclose what the Constitution
should mean.
Second, the Alaska Supreme Court failed to recognize the
profound importance of a right to physician-assisted suicide to the
right of privacy.  As described earlier, the Alaska Supreme Court
previously had said that the very core of liberty “is the notion of to-
tal personal immunity from government control: the right to be let
alone.”76  Few, if any decisions, are more deeply personal or more
important than whether to end one’s life.  Professor Tribe ex-
pressed this well when he wrote:
Of all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the most
profound and intimate relate to two sets of ultimate questions:
first, whether, when, and how one’s body is to become the vehi-
cle for another human being’s creation; second, when and how—
this time there is no question of “whether”—one’s body is to
terminate its organic life.77
Third, the Alaska Supreme Court overstated the problems of
recognizing a right to physician-assisted suicide.  To be sure, the
court raised important concerns: protecting vulnerable individuals,
defining who is mentally competent, and determining who is termi-
nally ill.78  Yet, these problems do not justify the failure to recog-
nize a right.  Oregon has dealt with these concerns in its “Death
With Dignity” law allowing physician-assisted suicide, as have for-
eign countries such as the Netherlands.79  If the Alaska Supreme
Court had recognized such a right to physician-assisted suicide,
then the legislature almost certainly would have responded with
necessary statutes to regulate the practice.
The fundamental flaw in the Alaska Supreme Court decision
was in leaving the issue of physician-assisted suicide solely to the
legislative process.  The Alaska Constitution’s express protection
of privacy gives the Alaska judiciary a key role in ensuring that ba-
74. E.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975).
75. E.g., State, Dep’t of Health and Social Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of
Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904, 906 (Alaska 2001).
76. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972) (internal citation omit-
ted).
77. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1337-38 (2d ed.
1988).
78. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 96 (Alaska 2001).
79. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 n.8 (1997) (citing Rodri-
guez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D.L.R. (4th) 342, 404 (Can.
1993)) (noting that in most western democracies it is a crime to assist suicide).
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sic aspects of privacy are protected from legislative intrusion.  The
Alaska Supreme Court failed to answer the fundamental question:
why should the State force a terminally ill patient to continue to
live against his or her will?  The Alaska Supreme Court should
have found that the law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide vio-
lates the most fundamental aspect of privacy: the right of a person
to choose whether to live or die.
III.  DRUG TESTING
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Willingness to Allow Drug
Testing
Almost without exception, the Supreme Court has approved
government drug testing and refused to find that it violates the
Fourth Amendment despite the fact that the Court has clearly rec-
ognized that drug testing—examining a person’s blood or urine for
signs of drug use—is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.80  The latter conclusion seems obvious, as drug testing
involves compelling a person to produce bodily fluids that are then
examined by the government to learn information about the indi-
vidual.
As with any search, the government can require drug testing if
there is sufficient probable cause.81  The question is whether the
government can mandate drug testing based on less than probable
cause and, potentially, without any individualized suspicion what-
soever.  Alarmingly, in several cases, the Supreme Court has ap-
proved warrantless, suspicionless drug testing.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,82 the Court ap-
proved a federal law authorizing drug testing for railway workers
after an accident occured.83  The law also authorized drug testing
when there was reasonable suspicion that an employee was intoxi-
cated or drug impaired and when there was a violation of safety
rules.84  Skinner therefore did not involve entirely suspicionless
searches.  The Supreme Court upheld the testing and emphasized
80. E.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)
(holding that collection and analysis of urine constitutes a search).
81. E.g., id. at 619 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)).
82. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
83. Id. at 634.
84. Id. at 611.
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that it was warranted by the government’s compelling interest in
railroad safety.85
A more troubling case from a privacy perspective is National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,86 in which the Supreme
Court approved suspicionless drug testing for customs workers who
were applying for promotions.87  The testing program was limited to
those who would be involved in the interdiction of drugs or who
would be carrying a firearm.88  The government did not claim that
there was any history of drug or alcohol abuse among customs
workers.89  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the govern-
ment’s interest in ensuring that customs workers who were respon-
sible for drug interdiction or were required to carry a firearm did
not use drugs warranted the invasion of privacy.90  The Court noted
that customs workers had access to contraband and could become
targets for bribes.91  This decision is troubling because the Court
did not require the government to demonstrate that testing based
on individualized suspicion would be inadequate to serve the gov-
ernment’s interest.
The Court also upheld random drug testing in two cases in-
volving students.  In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,92 the
Court deemed constitutional a school’s random drug testing of stu-
dents participating in interscholastic athletics.93  Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court in a 5-4 decision, stressed the danger of sports
and the risk that a drug-impaired student could be injured.94  The
Court also said that the invasion of privacy was minimal since stu-
dents already had to undergo physical exams and had to use public
locker rooms before and after an athletic practice or event.95  The
Court concluded that the invasion of privacy was justified because
of the school’s interest in preventing and detecting drug use among
its student athletes.96
85. Id. at 633.
86. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
87. Id. at 679.
88. Id. at 661.
89. Id. at 673-74.
90. Id. at 679.
91. Id. at 669.
92. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
93. Id. at 664-66.
94. Id. at 662.
95. Id. at 656-57.
96. Id. at 661-63.
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Then last year, in Board of Education of Independent School
Dist. No. 92 of Pottowotomie County v. Earls,97 the Court upheld a
school district’s policy of requiring random drug testing as a condi-
tion for participation in extracurricular activities.98  This case was
quite different from Vernonia in a number of respects.  The drug
testing program in Vernonia was limited to student athletes; Earls
involved drug testing of all students participating in extracurricular
activities.  In fact, the challenger in Earls was a student who wanted
to sing in the school choir.99  There is obviously far less danger of
injury from singing than in athletic events.  Also, there is not the
same diminished expectation of privacy in the choir as in the high
school locker room, which the Court stressed in Vernonia.  Most
important, according to the court of appeals, the school district in
Earls did not claim or prove a significant drug problem among stu-
dents participating in extracurricular activities.100  Rather, it said
that its goal was to prevent one from developing.101
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the random drug
testing in another 5-4 decision.  Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, emphasized the school’s important interest in preventing
drug use and reasoned that this justified the invasion of privacy.102
Justice Thomas said that random testing had the benefit of not re-
quiring schools to accuse particular students of drug use in order to
justify testing.103  This opinion is particularly troubling because it
would seemingly allow any school to require drug testing of any
student.
There are, however, two decisions in which the Supreme Court
rejected drug-testing requirements.  In Chandler v. Miller,104 the
Court declared unconstitutional a Georgia statute which required
that a candidate, in order to qualify for nomination or election to a
state office, submit to and pass a drug test.105  The Court found that
there was no proof of a drug problem in Georgia among its elected
officials.106  Additionally, the Court found that there was no special
need for the drug testing of candidates for state office, unlike the
97. 536 U.S. 822 (2002), 122 S.Ct. 2559 (2002).
98. 122 S.Ct. at 2562.
99. Id. at 2563.
100. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1272-74 (10th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 122
S.Ct. 2559.
101. 122 S.Ct. at 2567-68.
102. Id. at 2567.
103. Id. at 2568-69.
104. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
105. Id. at 309.
106. Id. at 319.
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case of railroad workers involved in accidents or customs workers
involved in drug interdiction.107  Nor could candidates for elected
office be analogized to students where schools have greater respon-
sibility and authority.108  The Court noted that the Georgia program
was likely to be only symbolic because the candidate could sched-
ule the test whenever he or she wanted.109
Ferguson v. City of Charleston110 involved a public hospital’s
program of drug testing pregnant women suspected of abusing
drugs based on specific criteria from a profile generated by the
government.111  In a 6-3 decision, the Court declared this unconsti-
tutional.112  The record showed that positive drug test results were
turned over to law enforcement and presumably used as the basis
for criminal prosecutions of the women,113 and that women were
being arrested just hours after giving birth, often while still in their
hospital gowns and bleeding heavily.114  Thus, the Court concluded
that drug testing for law enforcement purposes must meet the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment.115
Overall, the Supreme Court has been very supportive of drug
testing, particularly in the context of employment and education.
In these areas, the Court has been quite willing to find that the in-
terest in deterring drug use outweighS the invasions of privacy.
B. The Alaska Supreme Court Approves Random Drug Testing
Some commentators have predicted that the greater protec-
tion of privacy under the Alaska Constitution would mean greater
limits on drug testing in Alaska.116  But in its recent decision in
Alaska Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of An-
chorage,117 the Alaska Supreme Court approved suspicionless drug
107. Id. at 314-16, 318.
108. Id. at 316, 319.
109. Id. at 319.  Further, the Court found the statute to be symbolic because
there was no evidence of drug abuse among elected officials.  Id. at 321-22.
110. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
111. Id. at 71.  The program actually provided for suspicionless testing because
it used a profile but not any individualized factors.  See id. at 71 n.4.
112. Id. at 86.
113. See id. at 77 (emphasizing the lack of knowledge or consent of the pa-
tients).
114. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 488 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d 532
U.S. 67 (2001).
115. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
116. See Richard N. Cook, Drug Testing of Public and Private Employees in
Alaska, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 133, 154 (1988) (“[W]hile the federal test focuses on
the needs of the state, Alaska’s test is more concerned with the individual.”).
117. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001).
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testing for police and firefighters applying for promotion or trans-
fer, as well as those involved in vehicle accidents.118  However, the
court did declare unconstitutional the city’s requirement for ran-
dom drug testing of its police and firefighters.119
The Alaska Supreme Court began by noting that neither a
warrant nor probable cause is required to test employees involved
in such important positions.  The court stated:
[O]ur case law expressly recognizes that neither the warrant re-
quirement nor the requirement of probable cause invariably
governs searches occurring in the context of a heavily regulated
activity.  And as the superior court properly recognized here,
“special needs” findings are especially appropriate when em-
ployment occurs in a highly regulated, safety-essential field of
work.120
Quite significantly, the court concluded that “[w]orkers employed
in such fields necessarily expect reduced privacy in their job-related
activities and implicitly agree to a diminished level of privacy when
they accept employment.”121
The court rejected the argument that the government must
prove a drug problem in order to justify testing.122  Since it found
that drug testing was a relatively minimal invasion of privacy, and
that the government’s interest in preventing drug use among its
police and firefighters was substantial, it is not surprising that the
court upheld a substantial part of Anchorage’s drug testing pro-
gram.  In agreeing with the lower court, the supreme court stated:
[T]he Municipality’s interest in ensuring public safety is suffi-
ciently compelling to outweigh the relatively modest—though
admittedly not insignificant—intrusion on privacy that occurs
under the disputed Municipality policy when Police Employees
and Fire Fighters members are subjected to suspicionless urine
118. Id. at 557.  In an earlier decision, Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,
768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989), the Alaska Supreme Court held that a private em-
ployer’s drug testing program did not violate the state constitutional right to pri-
vacy and thus upheld the firing of two employees for failure to submit to drug
testing.  Id. at 1130.  The court concluded that the Alaska Constitution’s privacy
provision did not apply to private, non-government conduct.  Id.  The court stated:
“[t]he parties in the case at bar have failed to produce evidence that Alaska’s con-
stitutional right to privacy was intended to operate as a bar to private action . . . .”
Id.
119. Alaska Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n, 24 P.3d at 559.
120. Id. at 555 (citing Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 672 (1989)).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 556.
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testing upon application for employment, upon promotion, de-
motion or transfer, or after a vehicular accident.123
However, the court was not willing to go so far as to approve com-
pletely random testing.  It said that “random testing places in-
creased demands on employees’ reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.”124  The court further noted that
random testing is more intrusive: it subjects employees to a
greater degree of subjective intrusion.  An unannounced test’s
added element of “fear and surprise,” and its “unsettling show of
authority,” make random testing qualitatively more intrusive
than testing that is triggered by predictable, job-related occur-
rences such as promotion, demotion, and transfer.125
Thus, the court concluded that “the Municipality has failed to meet
its burden of establishing a special need for its random testing pro-
vision.”126
C. The Alaska Supreme Court’s Failure
Although the Alaska Supreme Court declared random drug
testing unconstitutional, it upheld drug testing without individual-
ized suspicion for police officers and firefighters applying for pro-
motion or transfer or even being demoted.127  In doing so it failed to
provide significantly more protection under the Alaska Constitu-
tion than under the United States Constitution.  In fact, the Alaska
Supreme Court’s decision is remarkably similar to the United
States Supreme Court’s ruling in National Treasury Union v. Von
Raab,128 which upheld suspicionless drug testing for customs work-
ers applying for promotion or transfer.129
There are several problems with the Alaska Supreme Court’s
analysis.  First, the court failed to justify the need for suspicionless
searches.  The government can depart from the constitutional
mandate that searches be based on individualized suspicion only by
proving that a requirement for suspicion will undermine the effec-
tiveness of its program.  Yet the government made no such show-
ing in Alaska Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Municipality
of Anchorage.130  Furthermore, the court did not even ask whether
123. Id. at 556-57.
124. Id. at 557.
125. Id. at 558 (internal citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 559.
128. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
129. Id. at 679.
130. See 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001).
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suspicionless searches were needed to accomplish the government’s
purposes.131
Second, the Alaska Supreme Court failed to give sufficient
weight to the well-established principle that the Alaska Constitu-
tion is given separate meaning, and often contains greater protec-
tions, than the United States Constitution.132  The Alaska Supreme
Court’s decision seemed heavily influenced, if not based on, federal
court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  The court began its opinion with a lengthy ex-
amination of United States Supreme Court rulings concerning drug
testing and the Fourth Amendment.133  Then, throughout its opin-
ion, the court referred to federal appellate court decisions uphold-
ing suspicionless testing regimes in comparable situations.134  In
fact, in declaring the random testing aspect of Anchorage’s pro-
gram unconstitutional, the court looked to federal law and “note[d]
that the United States Supreme Court has never approved an open
ended random-testing regime like the one at issue here.”135
The consistent focus on the United States Constitution and
federal court decisions is at odds with the tradition in Alaska, first
stated in Ravin v. State,136 of the separate meaning of Alaska consti-
tutional provisions and the independent analysis they require.137
Early in Alaska’s statehood, the Alaska Supreme Court declared:
We are not bound in expounding the Alaska Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court, past or future, which expound identical or closely
similar provisions of the United States Constitution . . . .  To
look only to the United States Supreme Court for constitutional
guidance would be an abdication by this court of its constitu-
tional responsibilities.138
Independent interpretation and protection of rights is par-
ticularly important when the Alaska Constitution contains a provi-
131. Id.
132. Id. at 550.
133. Id. at 551-55 (examining Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67
(2001); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
134. Id. at 557 & n.71.
135. Id. at 558 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672, concerning the advance notifi-
cation of drug testing).
136. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
137. See id. at 498, 500-01 (noting that Alaska employs a different test for ra-
tional basis scrutiny than the U.S. Supreme Court and that privacy is a specified
right under the Alaska Constitution).
138. Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969).
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sion with no analogue in the United States Constitution.  In Alaska
Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage,
the Alaska Supreme Court assumed that the privacy clause in the
Alaska Constitution should be interpreted and applied under the
principles used in the federal courts’ Fourth Amendment analy-
sis.139  The court never even acknowledged the greater protection of
privacy rights intended by the voter initiative that added privacy as
an enumerated right to the Alaska Constitution.140
Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court’s balancing of privacy in-
terests and government interests is questionable.  The court con-
cluded that the government’s interests outweigh the privacy inter-
ests implicated, but offered little analysis of this balancing.141  On
one side of the balance are the privacy interests of employees, but
these are never explicated in the opinion.  Drug testing invades
privacy rights in many respects: it is a search; it requires employees
to produce urine specimens in a manner that many find degrading
and embarrassing; it gives employers knowledge of what employees
are doing off the job, even when there is no showing of any rele-
vance to job performance.  There also is a real danger of false posi-
tives, meaning that employees can be subjected to adverse em-
ployment actions even though they have done nothing wrong.
On the other side of the balance is the government’s interest in
ensuring that police and firefighters never use drugs.  Interestingly,
the court implicitly rejected this interest as sufficient to support
drug testing when it declared random testing unconstitutional.142
Thus, the question is whether testing at the time of promotion, de-
motion, or transfer sufficiently serves the government’s interest to
warrant the invasion of privacy.  This issue is not addressed by the
Alaska Supreme Court and it is difficult to see why the govern-
ment’s interest at this stage outweighs the loss of privacy involved.
IV.  CONCLUSION
For over a dozen years, I have had the tremendous pleasure of
going to Alaska each spring to speak at the Alaska Bar Associa-
tion’s Annual Convention on recent developments in constitutional
law.  Over this time, I have had the opportunity to meet and speak
with the Justices of the Alaska Supreme Court.  I have developed
enormous admiration and respect for these Justices.  No state has a
more impressive judiciary than does Alaska.
139. 24 P.3d at 554.
140. Id. at 550.
141. Id. at 556-57.
142. Id. at 559.
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I have also come to understand Alaska’s deeply established
tradition of giving separate meaning to the Alaska Constitution
and often providing more protection for individual freedom than
exists under the United States Constitution.  I vividly recall my first
trip to Alaska in 1990 and meeting Chief Justice Jay Rabinowitz,
the visionary and architect of so much Alaska constitutional law,
including the right to privacy,143 and hearing him eloquently speak
about Alaska’s judicial history.
It is in this context that I find the recent decisions of the
Alaska Supreme Court, rejecting a state constitutional right to phy-
sician-assisted suicide and upholding drug testing, to be troubling.
These are important areas of privacy—whether to live or die, and
privacy in the workplace—where the Alaska Supreme Court had
the opportunity to be a national leader.  These are areas where the
Alaska Supreme Court could have found independent rights under
the Alaska Constitution’s privacy clause that are far more expan-
sive than those guaranteed through the restrictive interpretations
by the United States Supreme Court of the United States Constitu-
tion.  But unfortunately this did not occur and the promise of the
Alaska Constitution’s privacy clause was not realized.
143. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1975).
